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LITERATURE REVIEW  
How U.S. Government Policy Documents
Are Addressing the Increasing
National Security Implications
of Artificial Intelligence 
Bert Chapman1 
Artifcial intelligence is the future. . . .Whoever becomes the leader 
in this sphere will become the ruler of the world. 
~Vladimir Putin2 
Introduction 
Tis article emphasizes the increasing importance of artifcial intelligence (AI) 
in military and national security policy making. It seeks to inform interested 
individuals about the proliferation of publicly accessible U.S. government and 
military literature on this multifaceted topic. An additional objective of this en-
deavor is encouraging greater public awareness of and participation in emerging 
public policy debate on AI’s moral and national security implications. 
Artifcial intelligence has played a historically signifcant role in U.S. mil-
itary policy for multiple decades. An early demonstration of artifcial intelli-
gence’s interest in the academic community was a 1956 meeting on this subject 
at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire, organized by a mathe-
matics professor named John McCarthy. He maintained that this meeting was 
intended “to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning 
or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described 
that a machine can be made to stimulate it.” A 1972 Naval Weapons Laboratory 
report discussed the role of automatic theorem proving on computers and the 
role algorithms can play in problem solving, while acknowledging that the time 
when intelligent machines will do most of the work being done by humans is 
far away. Subsequent decades have seen the growing sophistication of technol-
ogy in civilian and military applications, increasing the ability of machines to 
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 1. Any artifcial system that performs tasks under varying and 
unpredictable circumstances without signifcant human over-
sight, or that can learn from experience and improve perfor-
mance when exposed to data sets. 
 2. An artifcial system developed in computer software, phys-
ical hardware, or other context that solves tasks requiring 
human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning, com-
munication, or physical action. 
 3. An artifcial system designed to think or act like a human, 
including cognitive architectures or neural networks. 
 4. A set of techniques, including machine learning, that is de-
signed to approximate a cognitive task. 
 5. An artifcial system designed to act rationally, including an in-
telligent software agent or embodied robot that achieves goals 
using perception, planning, reasoning, learning, communicat-
ing, decision making, and acting.4 
perform human tasks. Tis period also resulted in artifcial intelligence obtain-
ing increasing importance in U.S. national security policy making in publicly 
accessible literature produced by civilian and military agencies.3 
Statutory Definition of Artificial Intelligence 
Te John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 
defnes artifcial intelligence as: 
Journal of Advanced Military Studies 
Artifcial intelligence has experienced ebbs and fows in public attention 
with a recently released U.S. government commission report acknowledging it 
is receiving renewed popularity for multiple reasons: 
 • Te unprecedented availability of big data; 
 • More powerful computing, particularly use of specialized 
graphics processing units, which are suitable for parallel com-
putations by neural networks; 
 • Ubiquitous mobile connectivity, enabling AI technologies to 
be easily embedded and portable while managing data within 
the cloud; and 
 • Dramatic improvements in machine learning algorithms, es-
pecially those involving deep learning.5 
Tis resurgence in governmental interest in AI is refected in multiple recent 
publications from civilian governmental and military agencies. 
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Presidential and Executive Office 
of the President Documents 
Tis section examines the variety of U.S. civilian and military agencies pro-
ducing AI national security policy making documentation. It begins with 
documents from the president and White House ofces, such as the National 
Security Council (NSC) and National Science and Technology Council, which 
can be regarded as representing presidential administration policy aspirations. 
Tese materials refect the complexity of this public policy arena in areas such 
as executive orders, laws, regulations, and budgetary allocations. Tey also ex-
amine potential competition between agencies and relevant congressional over-
sight committees. Te competition typically involves determining which of 
these entities will have control of various segments of U.S. AI national security 
policy making and the monetary and stafng assets needed for efective imple-
ment of these programs. 
June 2019 saw the White House’s National Science and Technology Coun-
cil release Te National Artifcial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic 
Plan: 2019 Update, updating a 2016 version of an Artifcial Intelligence Re-
search & Development Strategic Plan produced by this ofce. Strategic objectives 
stressed in this document include making long-term investments in AI research, 
including developing scalable AI systems and fostering research on human-like 
AI; understanding and addressing AI’s ethical legal and societal implications; 
ensuring the safety and security of AI systems, including enhancing verifcation 
and validation and securing against attacks; and better understanding national 
AI research and development workforce needs.6 
Increasing the lethality of U.S. military forces and responding to resurgent 
conventional and nuclear threats from revisionist powers such as China and 
Russia has been a hallmark characteristic of the Donald J. Trump administra-
tion’s national security policy documents. Te 2017 National Security Strategy 
of the United States stressed: 
To maintain our competitive advantage, the United States will 
prioritize emerging technologies critical to economic growth 
and security, such as data science, encryption, autonomous 
technologies, gene editing, new materials, nanotechnology, 
advanced computing technologies, and artifcial intelligence. 
From self-driving cars to autonomous weapons, the feld of 
artifcial intelligence in particular is progressing rapidly.7 
Executive Order (EO) 13859, issued by President Trump on 11 February 2019, 
stressed that the United States must maintain leadership in AI. It emphasized 
the necessity of a concerted efort to promote technological and innovation ad-
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vancements. Additional EO emphases included protecting American technolo-
gy, economic and national security, civil liberties, and privacy while enhancing 
national and industry collaboration with allied foreign partners.8 
In response to EO 13859 multiagency reporting requirements, the Depart-
ment of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology issued 
U.S. Leadership in AI: A Plan for Federal Engagement in Developing Technical 
Standards and Related Tools on 10 August 2019. Tis treatise called for develop-
ing technical standards for advancing efective, reliable, robust, and trustworthy 
standards. Tese include data sets in standardized formats, including metadata 
for training, validation, and testing of AI systems; tools for capturing and repre-
senting knowledge and reason in AI systems; fully documented cases providing 
a range of data and information about specifc AI technologies, standards, and 
best practice guides used in decision making and deploying these applications; 
documented cases proving a range or data and information about specifc AI 
technologies, standards, and best practice guides used in decision making and 
deploying these applications; and metrics to quantifably measure and charac-
terize AI technologies.9 
On 30 August 2019, the Ofce of Management and Budget issued the 
Trump administration’s memorandum “Fiscal Year 2021 Administration Re-
search and Development Budget Priorities” (1 October 2020–30 September 
2021), which outlined research and development budget priorities. Te Amer-
ican security section of this document stressed the importance of investing in 
research and development to deliver advanced military capabilities to meet 
emerging threats and protect American security. Tese capabilities include of-
fensive and defensive hypersonic weapons, resilient national security space sys-
tems, and modernized and fexible strategic and nonstrategic nuclear deterrent 
capabilities. Te American leadership in the industries of the future section 
highlights departmental and agency prioritizing basic and applied research 
spending consistent with EO 13859—emphasizing AI, quantum information 
science, and computing and strengthening workforce capability in these areas.10 
Artifcial intelligence research and development spending requests among 
civilian government agencies for fscal year (FY) 2020 was $654.4 million, ac-
cording to a 10 September 2019 document from the White House’s National 
Science and Technology Council. Te National Institutes of Health and the 
National Science Foundation accounts for $448.1 million of this amount.11 
Another emerging sculptor of the national security implications of artif-
cial intelligence for the U.S. is the National Security Commission on Artifcial 
Intelligence (NSCAI). Established in 2018 by the FY 2019 National Defense 
Authorization Act, Congress directed NSCAI to examine U.S. competitiveness 
in artifcial intelligence, machine learning, and other associated technologies re-
lated to national security. It was tasked with developing means and methods for 
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the United States to maintain technological leadership in national defense and 
security technologies, and monitor international cooperation and trends and 
developments and competitiveness, including foreign artifcial intelligence and 
machine learning investments related to national security. Te NSCAI found 
ways of fostering greater emphasis and investment, stimulating academic, pri-
vate, public, and collaborative investments related to national security, includ-
ing workforce and education incentives for attracting and recruiting leading 
talent in artifcial intelligence and machine learning disciplines, such as science, 
technology, engineering, and math programs. It evaluated risks involving U.S. 
and foreign country advances in military employment of artifcial intelligence 
and machine learning, including international law of armed confict, interna-
tional humanitarian law, and escalation dynamics. Te NSCAI implemented 
means for establishing data standards and incentivizing sharing of open train-
ing data within national security and defense data industries and studied the 
evolution of artifcial intelligence and appropriate mechanisms for managing 
national security and defense technology. 
NSCAI released an initial report in July 2019, an interim report in No-
vember 2019, and is scheduled to release its fnal report in November 2020.12 
Interim report fndings express concern that AI developments are linked to 
emerging strategic competition with China and broader global geopolitical de-
velopments. Tese concerns include that the United States’ role as the world’s 
preeminent innovator is threatened, and that strategic competitors and non-
state actors will use AI to threaten Americans, our allies, and national values. 
Another concern is that AI-enabled capabilities may be used to threaten critical 
infrastructure, amplify disinformation campaigns, and wage war.13 
Consensus judgments on AI’s national security relevance presented in 
NSCAI’s interim report include the inherent endurance in AI-enabled autono-
mous systems, which can provide round-the-clock overhead reconnaissance and 
vast data quantities to give decision makers options about prioritizing mainte-
nance needs or selecting which forces or equipment to send into battle. Te 
U.S. government is not leveraging basic commercial AI to improve business 
practices and save tax dollars. Departments and agencies must modernize and 
become more efective and cost-efcient, and national security agencies need 
to rethink AI-ready workforce requirements, including extending knowledge 
of AI-relevant technologies through organizations, instilling training on ethical 
and responsible AI development at every level, and increasingly using modern 
software tools. Military and national security agencies need to improve their 
recruiting and incentives for top AI talent and American research universities 
and other research institutes need to be aware they are vulnerable to foreign 
exploitation and infuence from strategic competitors like China; AI presents 
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Te United States and its allies must coordinate early and often on AI-
enabled capabilities or military coalition efectiveness will sufer; U.S. diploma-
cy should explore possible AI cooperation with China and Russia on promoting 
AI safety and its impact on strategic stability. Federal law enforcement agencies 
should only use AI in ways constitutionally consistent with individual priva-
cy, equal protection, nondiscrimination, and due process. Tere is widespread 
concern over Chinese use of AI surveillance to persecute Uighurs and religious 
groups, along with concern that U.S. institutions with Chinese ties are building 
these systems. Te United States should take steps to prevent U.S. entities from 
unknowingly abetting such abuses through strong export controls, disclosure 
requirements, and economic sanctions.14 
Defense Department Documents: Autonomous Policy
Assessing the national security implications of AI is becoming increasingly pres-
ent in multiple Department of Defense (DOD) policy documents. A June 2016 
Defense Science Board study on autonomy made multiple recommendations to 
DOD for enhancing autonomous policy capabilities. Representative samples 
include military chiefs integrating technology insertion, doctrine, and concepts 
of operations by ensuring early experimentation uses alternative sources and 
informs employment doctrine. DOD components should also develop an au-
tonomy-literate workforce, and immediate action must be taken to counter 
adversary use of autonomy. Te Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) and other organizations should adapt existing intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance screening and data tools. Te Air Force’s Dynam-
ic Time Critical Warfghting Capability and the Marine Corps and DARPA 
should develop and experiment with a prototype heterogeneous, autonomous 
unmanned aircraft systems support team including 10 or more unmanned 
aircraft. Finally, DARPA should develop autonomous systems detecting large-
scale intrusions on the internet of things by passively and remotely monitoring 
bulk network trafc and identifying aggregate indicators of compromise hidden 
within the food of ordinary trafc.15 
Adopted in 2012 and amended in 2017, DOD Directive 3000.09, Autono-
my in Weapons Systems, refects ofcial DOD policy on weapons systems auton-
omy, such as autonomous and semiautonomous weapons systems designed to 
allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judg-
ment over the use of force. Tey must also complete engagements in a time-
frame consistent with commander and operator intentions and, if unable to 
do so, terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input before 
continuing the engagement. Policies should be sufciently robust to minimize 
failures that could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the 
system to unauthorized parties and provide clear procedures for trained opera-
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tors to deactivate system functions. Persons authorizing the use of, or operating 
autonomous and semiautonomous weapons systems, must use appropriate care 
in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety 
rules, and applicable rules of engagement.16 
DOD has established a Joint Artifcial Intelligence Center (JAIC) as the 
focal center of its AI strategy. Institutional objectives include accelerating 
AI-enabled capabilities, scaling departmental-wide AI impact, and synchroniz-
ing DOD AI activities to expand joint force advantages. Specifc examples of 
this include rapidly delivering AI-enabled capabilities to address key missions, 
strengthening current advantages, and enhancing emerging AI research and 
development eforts with mission needs, operational outcomes, user feedback, 
and data. Other objectives include establishing a common foundation for scal-
ing AI’s overall DOD impact, leading strategic data acquisition, and introduc-
ing unifed data stores and other attributes. Furthermore, JAIC will facilitate 
AI planning, policy, governance, ethics, safety, cybersecurity, and multilateral 
coordination, attracting and cultivating world-class team expertise on AI capa-
bility delivery and creating new accelerated AI learning experiences throughout 
DOD professional education and training levels.17 
Te unclassifed summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes 
that the emerging international security environment is impacted by rapid tech-
nological advances, including a relentless drive to develop new technologies such 
as advanced computing, “big data” analytics, AI, autonomy, robotics, directed 
energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology. Tis work stressed that DOD “will 
invest broadly in military application of autonomy, artifcial intelligence, and 
machine learning, including rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to 
gain competitive military advantages.”18 
On 6 February 2019, DARPA announced the creation of the Guaranteeing 
AI Robustness Against Deception (GARD) program. Tis endeavor develops 
new generation defenses against adversarial deception attacks on machine learn-
ing models. Current defense eforts are structured to protect against specifc 
predefned hostile attacks while remaining vulnerable to attacks outside design 
perimeters when tested. GARD seeks to expand machine learning defense by 
developing broad-based defenses addressing numerous possible attacks in a giv-
en scenario. Tree foci of GARD include: 
• Developing theoretical foundations for defensible machine 
learning with a lexicon of new defense mechanisms based on 
them; 
• Creating and testing defensible systems in divergent setting 
ranges; and 
• Constructing a new testbed capable of characterizing machine 
learning defensibility relative to threat scenarios.19 
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U.S. Military and Intelligence 
Artificial Intelligence Spending 
Tere are various estimates of U.S. military spending on artifcial intelligence. 
On 7 September 2018, DARPA said it will spend up to $2 billion advancing AI 
during the next fve years as part of a “Tird Wave” campaign intended to de-
velop machines capable of learning and adapting to changing environments.20 
A commercial database claimed DOD spent $7.4 billion on AI, big data, and 
cloud computing in FY 2017, with this total expected to reach $18.82 billion 
by 2025. Target areas of this increased AI spending include warfare platforms, 
cybersecurity, logistics and transportation, target recognition, battlefeld health 
care, combat simulation and training, threat monitoring and situational aware-
ness, and AI and data-information processing. Te website Breaking Defense 
reported on 18 September 2019 that JAIC would see its budget double to more 
than $208 million with probable signifcant increases after 2021.21 
A recent Naval War College Review assessment on emerging military spend-
ing on AI maintained that the Air Force allocated $87 million in 2019 for exper-
imenting with war games and feld training. Te Army allocated $6.5 million 
for training, including simulations and virtual reality in 2019, and will begin 
felding new unmanned combat systems by late 2019 with these being assigned 
to operational units by 2021. Te eventual goal is for the Army to replace the 
M1 Abrams main battle tank and M2 Bradley infantry fghting vehicle. It also 
noted that the Marine Corps allocated $7.1 million for an unmanned warning 
system providing commanders with increased situational awareness. Te Navy 
also allocated $6.5 million for AI training purposes, including submarine com-
bat assets.22 
Determining intelligence spending on AI is extremely difcult due to lim-
ited public disclosure of operationally specifc items. A November 2019 Con-
gressional Research Service report calculated FY 2020 National Intelligence 
Program spending at $62.8 billion and Military Intelligence Program spend-
ing for 2019 at $22.95 billion for a cumulative total of approximately $85.8 
billion, representing 11.3 percent of overall defense spending. Debate about 
what degree the U.S. intelligence budget should be publicly disclosed remains 
ongoing.23 
U.S. Armed Service Analyses of Machine Learning 
Analysis of how AI and machine learning may afect operations of individ-
ual Armed Service branches in various threat scenarios is refected in litera-
ture produced by the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy. Autonomous 
Horizons: Te Way Forward is a 2019 work from the Air Force’s Air University 
Press focusing on emerging steps in autonomous systems development felding 
and training. It presents recommendations for enhancing autonomous systems 
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capabilities in six areas: behavioral objectives, architectures and technologies, 
challenge problems, development processes, organizational structures, and 
knowledge platform. 
Tese recommendations for enhancing autonomous systems capability in-
clude design ensuring profciency in the given environment, tasks, and team-
mates envisioned during operations. Desired properties of profciency include 
situated agency, capacity for adaptive cognition, allowance for multiagent emer-
gence, and ability to learn from experience. Autonomous systems should be 
designed to ensure trust when operated by or teamed with human counterparts. 
Desired tenets of trust include cognitive congruence and/or transparency of de-
cision making, situational awareness, design enabling natural human-system 
interaction, and a capability for efective human-system teaming and training. 
Tey also include developing one or more common autonomous system archi-
tecture capable of consuming multiple frameworks across disparate communi-
ties. 
Te architecture should be functionally structured to enable extensibility 
and reuse, make no commitment on symbolic versus subsymbolic processing for 
component functions, incorporate memory and learning, and support human 
teammate interaction as needed. Mission-oriented challenge problems with the 
two objectives should be selected for testing: a) addressing current or future 
operational gaps that may be well-suited for autonomous system application; 
and b) challenging the science and technology community to make signifcant 
advances in the science and engineering of autonomous system functionality. 
Trough the U.S. Air Force chief data ofcer, acquire space to store the Services 
air, space, and cyber data so that AI professionals can use it to create autono-
my solutions to challenge problems. Create data curator roles in relevant orga-
nizations to manage the data and establish the Autonomy Capabilities Team 
within the Air Force Research Laboratory, incorporating a “fatarchy” business 
model to bring experts into a single product-focused organization to develop 
the science of autonomous systems while delivering capabilities to the warf-
ighter. Develop a knowledge platform centered on combining an information 
technology platform approach, with a platform business model. A knowledge 
platform designed for the multidomain operating Air Force should monopolize 
the connection of observation agents with knowledge creation agents and with 
warfghting efects agents, which can be either human or machine-based agents 
(autonomous systems).24 
Another 2019 publication, Artifcial Intelligence: China, Russia, and the 
Global Order: Technological, Political Global, and Creative Perspectives, examines 
how AI is afecting the global strategic environment with particular emphasis 
on its use by China and Russia. It notes that AI technology advances beneft 
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Russia. Globally, countries are looking at democratic and dictatorial uses of 
AI to afect domestic developments in authoritarian, hybrid, and democratic 
countries. 
U.S. policy makers should use a three-pronged strategy to understand 
this challenge and develop global policy, including ensuring the protection 
and robustness of U.S. democracy as it adapts to these new technologies. It 
must respond to domestic threats (e.g., capture by a tech oligopoly or drift to 
a surveillance state) and external threats without becoming governed by a mili-
tary-industrial complex. U.S. digital democracy, if successful at home, will exert 
gravitational infuence globally; the United States must exert infuence efec-
tively and manage potential escalation in the swing states (e.g., Asia or Europe) 
and global systems (e.g., norms and institutions) that form the key terrain for 
competition among the digital regime types. U.S. pushback on the diplomatic, 
economic, informational, and commercial dimensions will be crucial with allies 
and other states but must do so in ways that manage the signifcant risks of 
spiraling fear and animosity.25 
One section of Artifcial Intelligence, China, Russia, and Global Order ex-
amines AI and military dimensions in international competition. It focuses on 
hacking making AI more important by searching for vulnerabilities in opposing 
systems whose exploitation enhances national leverage, changing the nature of 
warfare and the risks of confict escalation from AI-enabled military systems. 
Additionally, China’s People’s Liberation Army is exploring AI technological 
use in future command decision making by overcoming admitted defciencies 
in commanders’ capabilities and leveraging AI technologies to achieve decision 
superiority in emerging “intelligentized” warfare. Tis section of the book also 
examines Chinese eforts to integrate neural networks into its hypersonic plat-
forms, potentially heralding a shift from active defense to a more ofensive pos-
ture. Russia’s military is also investing heavily in creating an AI intellectual and 
physical infrastructure across its armed services while expanding cooperation 
between a growing high-tech infrastructure and expansive military-academic 
infrastructure.26 
Te potential of AI to change war is also refected in Army professional mil-
itary literature. A 2018 Army Command and General Staf College study noted 
AI can enhance an Army commander’s ability to exercise mission campaigns. 
Tis involves the Mission Command Battle Lab in the Army’s Capability De-
velopment Integration Directorate taking a leading role in developing tools the 
Army can use with AI for enhancing human capacity and capability. Tis trea-
tise also noted that it is a matter of when, not if, militaries focus on using AI in 
future wars. It stresses that the Army will focus eforts on human-AI teaming 
and that the machine’s advantage over humans consists of unlimited bandwidth 
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 • Revising the Army cloud strategy to establish an accessible, 
secure cloud environment that is an AI and machine learning- 
ready hybrid to share system data more easily to support  
decision-making speed and lethality; 
 • Developing and recommending policy and procedures for an 
identity, credential, and access management system that will 
efciently issue and verify credentials to nonperson entities, 
such as AI agents and machines authorized to operate on 
Army networks; 
 • Reviewing all information technology, network, and cyber-
security policies to account for developing and employing 
emerging AI capabilities and tools on Army networks; 
 • Reviewing all information technology network, and cyber-
security policies to account for developing and employing 
emerging AI capabilities and tools on Army networks; and 
 • Developing and recommending standards-based technical ar-
chitecture establishing a common foundation underpinning 
all AI and machine learning capabilities, including network 
connectivity, data access and availability, hybrid cloud hosting 
capabilities, and data protection mechanisms.29 
and a narrowly defned focus within a clearly defned structure, which can easily 
outperform the best human counterparts.27 
Conclusions of this work stress that AI places large volumes of information 
at commanders’ fngertips, provides access to other’s experiences, and usefully 
enhances cognition by organizing large volumes of information and presenting 
only situationally pertinent information. If employed correctly, AI gives the 
military an asymmetrical advantage by providing greater access to the informa-
tion environment, allowing commanders to shape the operational environment. 
Tis shaping efort does not require employing forces, enabling operations to 
begin long before troop movements. Such deployment allows military com-
manders to conduct operations deep behind enemy lines with minimal or zero 
political risk.28 
Army AI activities can also involve collaboration with business and aca-
demic entities. Army Directive 2018–18, issued on 2 October 2018, involves 
collaboration between DOD’s JAIC and projects based at Carnegie Mellon 
University, which has established an Army-Artifcial Intelligence (AI) Task 
Force (AATF) to enhance existing AI capabilities by leveraging existing tech-
nological applications to enhance warfghters, preserve, peace, and win wars. 
AATF’s ultimate objective is rapidly integrating and synchronizing AI activities 
across the Army and DOD. AATF program objectives include: 
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U.S. Marine Corps AI discussion and analysis is also growing exponential-
ly. Te 2016 Marine Corps Operating Concept stresses that “even in a world of 
ever-increasing technology, we must continue to provide combat formations ca-
pable of closing with and destroying the enemy.”30 Te Marine Corps Operating 
Concept goes on to stress that the Corps must be a lethal force combining arms 
with information warfare and destroying and defeating enemies across air, land, 
sea, space, and cyberspace. It also notes that information used as a weapon com-
plicates the United States’ ability to gain and maintain accurate, up-to-date, and 
intelligence-driven understanding of conficts. Additionally, the Marine Corps 
is not presently organized, trained, and equipped to meet future operating en-
vironment demands featuring complex terrain, technology proliferation, infor-
mation warfare, the need to shield and exploit signatures, and an increasingly 
nonpermissive maritime domain.31 
To successfully adapt to this environment, the Corps must learn to use un-
manned systems and automation at all echelons and in every domain. Master-
ing the human-machine interface represents a military operational revolution. 
Te Marine Corps must understand and manage heat and radar signatures by 
combining mission control and use decoys, cover, concealment, camoufage, 
and deception. It should also exploit data strategies and information-sharing 
architectures to gain benefts from machine-aided tipping and relational vi-
sualization, along with displaying battlefeld threats, expediting commanders’ 
ability to quickly and intuitively understand complex situations. Te Marine 
Corps must engage in information warfare by enhancing our ability to identify 
and oppose adversary narratives by using counternarrative methods, such as 
competing narratives, as well as reducing voices contributing to hostile narra-
tives. Te United States could exploit human-machine and artifcial intelligence 
interfaces to enhance performance.32 
Tree recent Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfghting 
(SAW) master’s theses describe how emerging Marine Corps leaders view AI 
and its possible integration into military operations. Joshua E. Cavan’s thesis, 
“Artifcial Intelligence and the First to Fight: Te Implications of Artifcial In-
telligence for Forward-Deployed and Early-Deploying Forces in Contingency 
Operations” notes AI can quickly process large data volumes, convert the data 
to information, and point to courses of action based on an algorithm in ways 
and speeds beyond human cognitive processing. He notes that AI is limited by 
its foundational machine learning, requiring vast amounts of data, and collect-
ing sufcient machine learning of military AI systems may become important 
for forward-deployed and early-deploying forces, including country teams, spe-
cial operations, expeditionary, naval, air, and forward-deployed ground forc-
es.33 Cavan’s work argues that the United States should avoid being surprised
by hostile deception processes by using data collected by advance- and forward-
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deployed forces to quickly spot signifcant deviations from preconfict patterns. 
Tis information could drive decision-making tempo by analyzing hostile use 
of AI to exploit opportunities to protect friendly operations through surprise. 
It stresses using ambiguity to achieve surprise by referencing Russian forces’ use 
of ambiguity during the 2014 Crimean annexation. Te conclusion warns the 
American government to guard against surprise by avoiding being formulaic 
and predictable in decision making when there is excessive dependence on AI at 
the cost of human creativity. It is possible the United States and its allies may ef-
fectively use this creativity and national tradition of individual initiative against 
authoritarian societies if their mutual AI capabilities are of equal quality.34 
A second SAW master’s thesis, Jason C. Copeland’s “Swarms of Flying
iPhones: Using Limited Artifcial Intelligence to Root Out an Adversary,” stress-
es that evolving technology will increase the lethality of future wars. Noting the 
increasing urbanization of global demographics and the probability that more 
military confict will occur in such areas, the author stresses the increasing im-
portance of small unmanned aerial systems and their AI capabilities in changing 
the character of future war. Tey could provide critical targeting information to 
separate and target adversaries from friendly or neutral populations as they seek 
shelter from bullets and bombs.35 
Copeland goes on to express concern that a Marine Corps squad could ex-
perience cognitive overload with the amount of information provided, such as 
integrating and making sense of an unmanned aerial system feed while winning 
a frefght. He notes that an individual squad leader could efectively receive 
redirecting intelligence for a patrol based on later intelligence updates produced 
by small unmanned aerial systems swarms compiling, sorting, and supporting 
real-time information into actionable intelligence. Additional determinations 
of this work are that weapons release is highly unlikely to defer to an automated 
system for killing human combatants, but that the data collected before decid-
ing to target a human can be exploited by machines to shorten the decision to 
strike. Tis technology is not currently available since a fying iPhone would 
need a multimegapixel camera, require long air loiter times, extended range 
from the base station recharging the small unmanned aerial systems, and a high 
bandwidth data downlink.36 
How machine learning transforms the joint targeting process is analyzed 
by a third SAW thesis, Joseph F. Sgro Jr.’s “A Blueprint to Exploiting Artif-
cial Intelligence: How Machine Learning Is Transforming the Joint Targeting 
Process.” Tis work notes that Project Maven, a former collaborative venture 
between Google and the Department of Defense, aspired to accelerate military 
integration of big data and machine learning by using machine learning algo-
rithms to efciently process large volumes of video footage collected by aerial 
drones and identifying objects that analysts had previously evaluated. Oppo-
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sition to this program by some Google employees led to it being sourced to 
competitors, such as Booz Allen Hamilton.37 
Recommendations made by Sgro include DOD increasing its AI budget 
and focusing heavily on machine learning to support military intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance and data collection for joint force commanders. 
Te DOD could leverage AI within the traditional collections and analysis pro-
cess, expanding the reach of available information in developing shared under-
standing while accelerating the collection process. AI would need to monitor, 
collect, and exploit adversary media outlets to facilitate development of joint 
intelligence preparation of the environment to increase intelligence collections. 
Machine learning has the ability to ofer systems-oriented collections in mili-
tary, information, economic, and infrastructure systems and will play a critical 
role with its ability to fnd, fx, and track military targets while also providing 
combat assessment and battle damage assessment.38 
Scrutiny of AI’s potential for naval operations is ongoing in this Service’s 
literature. A 2015 U.S. Naval War College thesis asserts that AI may “potential-
ly revolutionize national security afairs by decreasing the human cost of war 
while increasing the speed and efciency of America’s tools of national power at 
the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of confict.”39 Tis could produce 
a future AI race or the emergence of very intelligent or hostile AI requiring 
combatant commanders to develop ways to confront hostile AI with faster and 
more linear thinking processes. 
A late 2019 Naval War College Review assessment on AI’s potential role in 
naval operations maintained that autonomous AI war-fghting machines are 
years away, along with operational applications of swarm techniques, autono-
mous copilots for pilots, and general AI, which attempts to mimic the human 
brain in completely autonomous thought. However, it stressed widespread AI 
adaptation that produces three benefts. By collecting and compiling data now, 
the Navy and Marine Corps will have larger databases from which AI can learn, 
and these larger databases frequently produce more efective AI systems. In ad-
dition, fewer naval personnel 
will be restricted to the noncombat sector if support functions 
are transferred to AI. Tis development frees up manpower 
for use in new specialties, additional combat units, and for-
ward deployments around the world. Finally, the sooner the 
[Department of the Navy] DoN can expose average Marines 
and sailors to AI, the more familiar and comfortable they will 
become with the technologies. In the future, when the full 
capabilities of AI are harnessed and implemented throughout 
the services, the fghting force will be ready to embrace them.40 
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Intelligence Community Research 
AI’s potential is also being thoroughly analyzed and deployed within the intelli-
gence community. In 2019, the Ofce of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) released its unclassifed Augmenting Intelligence using Machines 
(AIM) initiative. ODNI noted that data generation pace, whether through 
collection or publicly available information, is increasing exponentially and 
exceeds our ability to understand or fnd the most relevant data for making 
analytic judgments. 
Te AIM initiative’s executive summary stresses that the intelligence com-
munity is carefully considering methods for fully automating well-defned pro-
cesses and augmenting human expertise with analytics or planning capabilities 
for their potential beneft. Tey are monitoring the vulnerability of these tech-
nologies in development and adoption. AIM seeks to determine how the intel-
ligence community can best manage uncertainty by achieving operational risk 
suited to the demonstrable analytic and operational advantages in AIM-enabled 
solutions and tradecraft. Tis strategic imperative of leveraging private invest-
ment, focusing on areas of unique mission need, and rethinking how to attract 
and retain human expertise exists because our adversaries, notably Russia and 
China, also recognize AI’s potential to transform military and intelligence oper-
ations and are investing aggressively to make that advantage a reality.41 
Primary AIM investment objectives are the immediate and ongoing 
strengthening of a digital foundation, data science, and technical intelligence 
to enhance understanding of the commercial supply chain, determining on-
going federal government programs that can be leveraged for wider audiences, 
and identifying adversarial AI uses. A second short-term objective is adopting 
commercial and open source AI solutions by rapidly transitioning the best com-
mercial and open source narrow AI capabilities where technology outperforms 
humans in a very narrow specifcally defned task, such as playing chess. A 
third and medium-term objective is developing the capability and capacity to 
exploit available data across all human, imagery, measurement, open source, 
and signals intelligence, while developing AI solutions processing and relating 
information from multiple modalities, breaking down traditional intelligence 
stovepipes such as using data from multiple intelligence agencies and open 
sources. A fourth and long-term AIM investment objective is investing in basic 
research focused on sense-making, aspiring to increase trust between human 
and machine teams, while also achieving research advances in knowledge repre-
sentation of AI, goals and intent, entity extraction from incomplete multimodal 
data, and discourse generation.42 
Te Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency (IARPA) is a critical 
incubator of intelligence community research and development as the follow-
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gious amounts of video clips are generated daily on many consumer electronics 
and uploaded to the internet. Such videos are produced for broadcast or from 
planned surveillance, presenting signifcant challenges for manual and auto-
mated analysis. Aladdin aspires to combine state-of-the-art video and audio 
extraction, knowledge representation, and searchable technologies to create 
fast, accurate, robust, and extensible technology supporting future multimedia 
analytic needs.43 
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency Programs 
Te Better Extraction from Text Towards Enhanced Retrieval (BETTER) pro-
gram seeks to develop methods for extracting fne-grained semantic information 
focusing on whom-did-what-to-whom-when-where across multiple languages 
and problem domains. Such extracted information is applied to an information 
retrieval task. Focusing on human-in-the-loop computation requiring human 
interaction in modeling and simulation is an additional BETTER focus area. 
BETTER also focuses on performer systems requiring the ability to incorporate 
human judgments for metrics, including relevancy and the accuracy of extracted 
and retrieved information.44 Another program that seeks to extract information 
and intelligence from multiple sources is Crowdsourcing Evidence, Argumen-
tation, Tinking and Evaluation, which seeks to develop and experimentally 
test systems using crowdsourcing and structured analytic techniques to improve 
analytic reasoning. Such systems aspire to help humans better understand the 
evidence and assumptions supporting or conficting with human conclusions. 
Tey also help users better communicate their reasoning and conclusions. Tis 
U.S.-Australian collaboration is projected to last 4.5 years.45 
Cyber-attack Automated Unconventional Sensor Environment (CAUSE) 
acknowledges cyberattacks evolve in a phased approach. Detection typically oc-
curs in an attack’s later phase and analysis is often postmortem to investigate 
and discover early phase indicators. Observing earlier attack phases, including 
target reconnaissance, planning, and delivery may facilitate warning of signif-
cant cyber events before their most damaging phases. CAUSE seeks to develop 
and test new automated methods forecasting and detecting cyberattacks signif-
cantly earlier than existing methods. Prime contractors include BAE Systems 
and Electronic Systems Integration, Charles River Analytics, Leidos, and the 
University of Southern California.46 
Te Deep Intermodal Video Analytics (DIVA) program develops robust 
automatic activity detection for a multicamera streaming video environment. 
Such activities will be enriched by person and object detection with DIVA 
addressing activity detection for forensic applications and real-time alerting. 
DIVA-derived research areas include machine learning, deep learning or hierar-
chical modeling, person detection and reidentifcation, tracking across multiple 
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nonoverlapping camera viewpoints, 3D video reconstruction, and super-reso-
lution.47 
Forecasting Counterfactuals in Uncontrolled Settings (FOCUS) seeks to 
develop and study the systematic approaches to counterfactual forecasting and 
lessons learned processes. Counterfactual forecasts represent statements about 
what would have happened if diferent circumstances had resulted. A postmor-
tem review of an analysis failure could produce a conclusion that analysts would 
have to avoid such failure in the future by employing better analytic tradecraft; 
double-checking assumptions; or considering a broader range of hypotheses. 
Counterfactual forecasts working in past circumstances often represent the basis 
for lessons learned on how to respond in the future and can be incorporated 
into best practices and tradecraft. 
FOCUS notes that there is limited research measuring which diferent ap-
proaches to counterfactual forecasting yield accurate or inaccurate counterfac-
tual forecasts. FOCUS also maintains that research is scarce on the accuracy of 
lessons drawn from divergent lessons learned approaches. Consequently, there 
is insufcient evidence-based guidance for approaching lessons learned activ-
ities or for developing counterfactual forecasts representing the core of such 
activities. FOCUS aspires to develop and empirically test alternative approaches 
to structuring counterfactual forecasting and lessons learned processes to be 
readily incorporated into lessons learned activities.48 
Te Hybrid Forecasting Competition (HFC) program develops and tests 
hybrid geopolitical forecasting systems to integrate human and machine fore-
casting components to create maximally accurate, fexible, and scalable fore-
casting capabilities of events as varied as disease outbreaks, elections, fnancial 
market fuctuations, and interstate confict. Since human-generated forecasts 
may be subject to cognitive biases or scalability limits, machine-generated sta-
tistical and computational forecasting approaches might prove more data driv-
en and scalable, but they are often unable to provide forecasts of idiosyncratic 
or newly emerging geopolitical subjects. 
Hybrid approaches may combine the strengths of these two approaches 
while reducing their individual weaknesses. HFC participants compete in a 
multiyear competition to identify approaches enabling the intelligence com-
munity to radically enhance the accuracy and timeliness of its geopolitical fore-
casts.49 
Department of State
Te Department of State is exploring ways of integrating AI into U.S. foreign 
policy and geopolitical forecasting. A 24 October 2018 speech by Christopher 
A. Ford, the assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of International Security 
and Nonproliferation, quoted Chinese president Xi Jinping that the revolution 
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in military afairs will be intertwined with a scientifc and technical revolution, 
with AI being incorporated into military systems and doctrine. Xi’s 19th Na-
tional Congress of the Communist Party of China speech on 18 October 2017 
stressed that AI military applications are part of intelligent warfare. Ford also 
noted that China sees military-civil fusion as involving AI and related disci-
plines including aerospace, aviation, big data processing, cloud computing, and 
nuclear technology.50 
Te Department of State’s Ofce of the Science and Technology advisor 
lists AI as an emerging and transformational technology, which the department 
is using to develop its foreign policy priorities, including analyzing and advis-
ing how this strategic foresight can inform real time decision processes.51 Te 
Department of State’s Ofce of Emerging Security Challenges (ESC) within the 
Bureau of Arms Control, Verifcation, and Compliance develops department 
positions for enhancing space security and missile defense cooperation among 
allies and partners. Te ESC leads departmental eforts to ensure polar region 
security and plays a leading role through encouraging cooperation, enhancing 
cyber strategic stability, and developing confdence-building measures such as 
including AI’s national security implications.52 
Congressional Reports: 
Civilian and Military Aspects of Artificial Intelligence 
Numerous congressional committees are involved in addressing civilian and 
military aspects of AI under its Article I U.S. Constitution powers. A 9 January 
2018 hearing by a House Armed Services Committee subcommittee examined 
China’s pursuit of emerging and exponential technologies, such as AI. Witness 
Paul Scharre of the Center for a New American Security maintained that China 
is second only to the United States in AI and that Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent 
are top-tier AI companies. He also claimed that since 2014 China has surpassed 
the United States in the number of deep-learning publications, while stressing 
that publication quantity does not necessarily represent quality. Scharre also 
noted that the 2017 meeting of the Association for the Advancement of Arti-
fcial Intelligence saw nearly as many accepted papers from China as from the 
United States and noted the U.S. world leadership in AI patents. Nevertheless, 
China’s AI patent rate is growing faster than the United States. China published 
a July 2017 national strategy for AI. Beijing’s goal is to be an AI global leader by 
2030, and China is striving to educate and recruit leading AI talent, including 
top-tier AI researchers.53 
William A. Carter of the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
stressed that China sees AI and quantum technology as foundational to long-
term economic and military competitiveness and has become an AI innovator. 
He also emphasized that Chinese companies have made signifcant AI break-
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throughs in natural language processing, real-time translation, imagery analysis, 
facial recognition, and autonomous driving. Carter stressed that the United 
States must counter Chinese eforts to exploit U.S. military dependence on in-
formation and communications technology by investing in resiliency of critical 
conventional and nuclear military infrastructure and ensuring that China never 
has confdence in their abilities to compromise U.S. systems with a frst strike.54 
General congressional interest in AI is refected by the Congressional Ar-
tifcial Intelligence Caucus. Its membership of 27 representatives during the 
116th Congress seeks to inform policy makers of AI’s economic, social, and 
technological impacts and promote rapid innovation in AI and related felds by 
bringing together academic, government, and private sector experts to discuss 
emerging technologies and opportunities.55 
Conclusion 
Artifcial intelligence has both positive and negative implications in civilian 
and military policy making and strategy. In January 2015, the Future of Life 
Institute, a collaborative of senior business and science leaders, including Tesla/ 
Space X founder Elon Musk and the late theoretical physicist Stephen Hawk-
ing, released an open letter warning of an existential risk presented by the next 
phase of AI research on humanity’s future. Tis document maintained that AI 
systems must do what we want them to do and adhere to human intentions.56 
In its November 2019 interim report, the U.S. National Security Commis-
sion on Artifcial Intelligence was blunt in its judgment that the United States is 
not using its AI strengths and strategies for national security advantages, mean-
ing that many agencies have not adopted AI into their missions.57 Te NSCAI 
military implications include “changes to how we fght,” such as military use 
of AI-enabled machines and weapons, enabling faster decision making in the 
battlefeld. Furthermore, 
AI will foster a new generation of semi-autonomous and au-
tonomous combat systems and operations. Autonomous capa-
bilities can be useful for a wide array of applications, including 
for predictive analysis, decision support systems, unmanned 
platforms, robotics, and weapons (both cyber and physical).58 
An additional November 2019 NSCAI contention is that AI is necessary to 
enable the United States to remain competitive. Te advantages of embracing 
AI are clear: 
Te Commission believes AI is key to the next technological 
leap forward which, if leveraged appropriately, will equip the 
United States to extend its advantages and preserve a cred-
ible deterrent in East Asia and Eastern Europe. AI-enabled 
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systems could allow U.S. forces to understand the battlespace 
more clearly and rapidly; use autonomous systems to mount 
operations even when communication links are under attack; 
and develop capabilities to better defend against adversary AI 
systems. Intelligence agencies will be able to integrate mas-
sive amounts of data and better identify threats and discern 
patterns, which will provide military commanders and policy 
makers with more timely and sophisticated analysis.59 
For Marine Corps personnel and policy makers, the 2016 Marine Corps 
Operating Concept argues that the full potential inherent in automation must be 
captured. It subsequently contends that putting people and machines together 
in the most efective pairing for the mission at hand is essential as machines be-
come more capable and autonomous. Fully exploiting automation’s power must 
take into account several things. Te Marine Corps must refne the concept 
of manned-unmanned teaming to integrate robotic autonomous systems with 
manned platforms and Marines. Te Corps should develop concepts of oper-
ations acting to accomplish mission objectives supporting and embracing ro-
botic autonomous systems as a critical enabler. Finally, the Marine Corps needs 
to develop unmanned reconnaissance and surveillance systems to investigate 
littoral environments and complex terrain features, including sewers, tunnels, 
subways, buildings, and caves.60 
Key fndings of this literature and subsequent research opportunities for 
scholars and policy makers include the United States and its military allies not 
making the mistake of assuming that potential battlefeld opponents will adhere 
to international law of war standards when using AI in military operations. 
Unrestricted Warfare, authored by two Chinese military ofcers in 1999 and 
published by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), essentially envisions no geo-
graphic restrictions on waging war as a result of emerging technological devel-
opments and the breakdown of long-standing boundaries between soldiers and 
civilians. Tis creates a borderless battlefeld with globalization increasing inter-
connectivity and makes it imperative that the United States and its allies adopt 
sufcient operational, tactical, and strategic fexibility to defend its interests and 
defeat its foes in such a Hobbesian military environment.61 
AI ofers the potential for more accurate forecasting of hostile actor inten-
tions. It remains to be seen whether this can be translated into more efective 
policy responses by the United States and its allies. Hostile countries and trans-
national organizations will seek various ways to respond to U.S. and allied use 
of AI against them. How will the United States and its allies respond to our 
adversaries’ use of AI? AI in national security policy making also must address 
the ethical question of human/machine agency in geopolitical decision making, 
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and all democratic countries must address the manifold dangers of letting hos-
tile actors have control of AI technology. 
Civilian and military policy makers must recognize that even with advanced 
information processing capabilities, it may not be possible to sort out timely, 
accurate, and policy relevant and actionable information by AI to national lead-
ers, military commanders, intelligence analysts, and military personnel on air, 
land, sea, and space. Te advent of AI is likely to have signifcant impacts on 
U.S. civilian law, military operational planning, international law, internation-
al laws of war, and personal privacy. How these results will impact the entire 
spectrum of civilian and military policy making in a constitutional republic is a 
question with major moral and policy making implications. 
Te United States must determine which agencies will coordinate, fund, 
and prioritize U.S. AI geopolitical and military programs. How much AI fund-
ing will agencies such as DOD, DARPA, and the intelligence communities 
receive, and will they use it efectively? Which congressional committees will 
take the lead in conducting oversight of federal national security AI funding? 
Will the current parochial and stove-piped approach to congressional national 
security oversight remain in place and keep AI national security policy making 
programs mired in a bureaucratic morass as with other federal programs? 
U.S. civilian and military leaders must also recognize that there are limits 
on how accurately AI can forecast human thinking and actions. Tis is particu-
larly true if these policy makers assume that hostile foreign national and trans-
national leaders are rational or adhere to anything resembling Western norms. 
Te emergence of AI poses acute challenges and opportunities for the U.S. 
intelligence and military communities, civilian national security policy makers, 
their congressional overseers and appropriators, and foreign civilian and mili-
tary leaders. Ofcial U.S. AI literature gives interested citizens the opportuni-
ty to participate in infuencing U.S. AI national security policy making. Tis 
can be done through interaction with relevant government agencies, provid-
ing feedback to congressional representatives, and commenting on proposed 
federal agency AI regulations under the 1946 Administrative Procedures Act. 
How these subjects and their profound moral implications are addressed in 
subsequent decades will infuence the conduct of wars, military strategy, and 
numerous national and international security matters that will be paid for with 
taxpayer dollars and civilian and military sacrifce when wars occur. 
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